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The Salans Report

The Salans Report


The heavily damaged USS Liberty the day after the attack.

Following is an official report to US Secretary of State Dean Rusk by
the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State who was asked to evaluate
the Israeli excuse for the attack upon the USS Liberty.

As readers will see, the legal advisor finds the excuse wanting in
nearly every detail. For political reasons, this report was withheld
from the public until the government was forced to release it under the
Freedom of Information Act.

===================================================================

The Salans Report

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Legal Adviser

September 21, 1967

TO: U — The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: L — Carl F. Salans

SUBJECT:

“The Liberty” — Discrepancies Between Israeli Inquiry and U.S.
Navy Inquiry –

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

As you requested, we have compared the decision of the Israeli Judge,
dated July 21, 1967, with the findings of the U.S. Navy Court of
Inquiry, and the Clifford Report, concerning the Liberty incident.

The following discrepancies are noteworthy:

I. Speed and Direction of the “Liberty”

The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boat Division Commander
reported and reconfirmed the target’s (Liberty’s) speed at 28 to 30
knots and that it had changed its navigational direction shortly after
1341 hours.

The U.S. Navy inquiry established that the Liberty had been on a steady
course at 5 knots from 1132 hours until the attack.

II. Aircraft Surveillance

The Israeli report indicates that a ship was reported in the area by
reconnaissance aircraft at 0600 and that another report was received of
a contact between an Israeli aircraft and a surface vessel about 0900.

The Navy Court finding of facts, plus testimony of various members of
the crew indicate reconnaissance overflights of the Liberty at 0515,
0850, 1030, 1056, 1126, 1145, 1220, and 1245.

III. Identification by Israeli Aircraft

The Israeli report indicates that the fighter aircraft carried out a run
over the ship in an effort to identify it.

The Navy Inquiry reports no such identification run. Commander McGonagle
testified that he observed one aircraft of similar characteristics to
those on earlier reconnaissance flights approximately five to six miles
from the ship at an altitude of 7,000 feet. He did not see it approach
the ship. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard from
the port side of the ship, apparently resulting from a rocket, launched
by a second aircraft.

IV. Identification by Torpedo Boats

The Israeli report indicates that the torpedo boats approached the
Liberty in order to establish visual contact and to identify it, and
that in addition, the Commander of the torpedo boats signalled the
Liberty requesting its identification. The Liberty reportedly answered,
“Identify yourself first,” and opened fire on the torpedo boats.

Commander McGonagle’s testimony indicated that the only signals from the
torpedo boats were those made during the high-speed approach from a
distance of approximately 2,000 yards and that it was not possible for
the Liberty to read the signals because of the intermittent blocking of
view by smoke and flames. No reply signal was sent. Immediately after
the Liberty was struck by a torpedo, the torpedo boats stopped at a
range of approx- imately 500 to 800 yards and one signalled by flashing
light in English “Do you require assistance?” Commander McGonagle
testified that he had no means to communicate with the boat by light but
hoisted “CODE LIMA INDIA”. (“I am not under command”, i.e., not able to
control movements of ship.)

V. Flag and Identification Markings

The Israeli report indicates that the fighter aircraft which reportedly
made an initial pass over the Liberty was looking for a flag but found
none; likewise no other identification mark was observed. “…Throughout
the contact no American or any other flag appeared on the ship….”
(Elsewhere the report had indicated that at 1055 the ship had been
identified as the Liberty “whose marking was GTR-5.”)

The Navy inquiry confirms by testimony of five members of the crew that
they had personally observed the Ensign flying during the entire morning
and up until the air attack. The Ensign was subsequently shot away
during the air attack. Before the torpedo attack, a second Ensign was
hoisted. The Navy report also found that “hull markings were clear and
freshly painted.”

The Clifford report noted that “the Liberty’s U.S. Navy’s distinguishing
letters and number were painted clearly on her bow. The Liberty’s name
was clearly painted in English on her stern. The ship’s configuration
and her standard markings were clearly sufficient for reconnaissance
aircraft and waterborne vessels to identify her correctly….” The
report noted that at all times prior to the air attack the Liberty was
flying her normal size American flag (5 ft. by 8 ft.) at the masthead.
Five minutes prior to the attack by the torpedo boats, the Liberty put
up a flag measuring 7 ft. by 13 ft. to replace the flag which had been
shot down in the air attack.

VI. Identification of Ship as “El-Kasir”

The Israeli report indicates that shortly before the torpedo boat attack
the torpedo boat Division Commander reported the certain identification
of the vessel as an Egyptian transport ship named “El Kasir”.
Identification of the target was made both by the Division Commander and
the commander of another torpedo boat. The Israeli Judge indicated in
his decision that “on examining photographs of the two ships, I am
satisfied that a likeness exists between them, and that an error of
identification is possible, especially having regard to the fact, that
identification was made while the ship was clouded in smoke.”

The Clifford report noted “That the Liberty could have been mistaken for
the Egyptian supply ship El Quseir is unbelievable. El Quseir has
one-fourth the displacement of the Liberty, roughly one-half the beam,
is 180 feet shorter, and is very differently configured. The Liberty’s
unusual antenna array and hull markings should have been visible to
low-flying aircraft and torpedo boats. …Trained Israeli naval
personnel should have been able easily to see and identify the larger
hull markings on the Liberty.”

Additional Observations Regarding Israeli Report

I. Speed of Liberty and “El Kasir” as Identification
Factors

The Israeli report states that the initial speed of the target reported
by the torpedo boat commander at 1341 hours as 30 knots was verified
within minutes and confirmed as a speed of 28 knots. The report notes
that it was the speed of the target which led to the final conclusion
that there was no reason for surmising that the target could possibly be
the Liberty.

The reported speed would have ruled out the “El Kasir” as the target, as
well as the Liberty since the top speed of the “Kasir”, published in
Janes Fighting Ships, is in the range of 14 knots. The Liberty’s top
speed is 18 knots.

II. Failure to Relate “Liberty” to Bombardment Capability

The Israeli report emphasizes that the attack originated with reports
that the El Arish area was being shelled from the sea. The implication
of such reports was obviously that a ship capable of such shelling was
present in the immediate offshore area, i.e., within gun range of the
shore.

It would be clear to any trained observer that the armament aboard the
Liberty was incapable of shore bombardment. It appears nevertheless that
neither the aircraft, torpedo boats, nor the command headquarters to
which they presumably reported evaluated the ship’s capability for shore
bombardment.

III. Time Sequence of Attacks

The Israeli report indicates that it had been agreed that as soon as the
torpedo boats located the target, aircraft would be dispatched. At 1341
hours the torpedo boat located the target. “A few minutes later”, the
dispatch of aircraft was requested. The first air attack occurred at
approximately 1400 hours.

Assuming “a few minutes later” would mean four or five minutes, the
request for aircraft must have occurred about 1345. One may infer from
the fact that within a period of approximately 15 minutes, the request
was transmitted, received, a command decision made, aircraft dispatched,
and the attack launched, that no significant time was expended in an
effort to identify the ship from the air before the attack was launched.

IV. Attack by Torpedo Boat After “Do Not Attack” Order

The Israeli report confirms that during the final attack by aircraft the
marking “CPR-5″ was noted on the hull and an order was transmitted to
the torpedo boat division not to attack. The order was recorded in the
log book of the flag boat at approximately 1420 hours. The torpedo boats
nevertheless began their attack run at approximately 1428. The Division
Commander later “claimed that no such message ever reached him.” The
Deputy Commander testified that “he received the message and passed it
on to the Division Commander.”

http://www.ussliberty.org/salans.htm
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